Given a neural system that equips an agent to attempt to carry out some learning task based on its own interaction with the ''non-social'' world, what extra neural machinery is required to enable learning to be facilitated by (repeated) observation of successful completion of that task by another agent? We provide one answer by exploiting an understanding of data and models on mirror neurons to extend a prior neurocomputational model of list learning by macaques, SCP1, which addressed results of the simultaneous chaining paradigm (SCP) to yield a new model, SCP2, that addresses social facilitation (observational learning) effects based on the SCP. SCP2 extends SCP1 by adding action-recognition elements and (vicarious) reward-processing elements to facilitate performance following observation of a demonstrator. Our simulations suggest prior experience is important for the observed facilitation and serves to bridge the (separately collected) neurophysiological and behavioral data. Crucially, the inner workings of SCP1, as distinct from its successful performance on the SCP dataset, are irrelevant. What is crucial is the ''wrapping'' of the ''do it alone'' model to support social facilitation. This study provides an example of dyadic brain modeling, simulating brain models of interacting agents, in the case in which the behavior of only one member of the dyad is affected by the behavior of the other.
Introduction
Social learning and cognition have long been recognized as providing strong evolutionary pressures for primates (Byrne & Whiten, 1988) , and it has been suggested that the pressure to acquire manual skills through imitation, among other skills, has served to ignite significant brain evolution in hominids, even to the point of facilitating the development of the ''language-ready brain'' (Arbib, 2012) . Behaviorally, different species of primates display a significant difference in ''imitative'' skills, at least as observed in controlled, experimental settings, and not all ''social learning skills'' are ''imitative.'' For example, Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, and Laland (2012) have shown that monkeys, apes, and humans solve ''puzzle box'' tasks differently, with only human children showing both pedagogy and the ability to directly imitate the successful solutions of ''demonstrators.'' In these tasks, rewards of increasing ''desirability'' depend on more complex manipulations of the box, with monkeys and apes limited, most often, to solving the first ''tier'' of complexity, while human children are capable of acquiring the most desirable reward following a demonstrator's performance. These results largely comport with comparative data (Horner & Whiten, 2005) comparing similar tasks between just apes and human children. However, monkeys are capable of some degree of social learning since, for example, naturalistic observations have shown palm nut cracking skill is maintained across generations within a particular population of cebus (capuchin) monkeys (Fragaszy et al., 2013) . However, going from ''naı¨ve'' to skilled in this task takes several years, and substantial trial-and-error learning must contribute to the gradual acquisition of these skills. Similarly, gorilla nettle processing, while predicated on observation of skilled adults, requires years of failure before juveniles can master the appropriate procedure for folding the leaves to avoid the harsh stingers (Byrne, 2003; Byrne & Russon, 1998 )see also Tennie, Hedwig, Call, and Tomasello (2008) for a critique.
Our concern here is to better understand neural mechanisms whereby observation of successful actions of a conspecific can facilitate a primate's acquisition of a new skill. In this article, we offer general insights informed by a focus on macaques and their capacity for observational learning in the simultaneous chaining paradigm (SCP). But before we describe this paradigm, some general observations are in order concerning data and modeling on mirror neurons.
Various neurocomputational models have been offered to explain the formation of these functional response types and their role in learning about one's own actions, as well as possible roles in re-mapping others' performances onto one's own motor repertoire, shedding new light on the neurophysiological data from di Pellegrino et al., 1992, and Rizzolatti et al., 1996) , onwards. Moreover, the models clarify the dependence of mirror neurons on interaction with neural systems ''beyond the mirror.'' For example, the Mirror Neuron System, or MNS, model (Oztop & Arbib, 2002) and the MNS2 model (Bonaiuto, Rosta, & Arbib, 2007 ) offered a scenario whereby the parity of response could be learned; namely, through associative learning between the efferent copy of the command for one's own action and the corresponding visual feedback of that action (or, in the case of MNS2, the action and the additional corresponding acoustic feedback should there be any) which then enables activation of mirror neurons for that action when seeing (hearing) that action performed by another. Thus, in the absence of acting oneself, visual (or acoustic) stimuli from another's actions may still drive the mirror neurons and facilitate action recognition.
Importantly, mirror neurons may be important in improving one's own actions, not just in recognizing the actions of others. The Augmented Competitive Queuing (ACQ) model (Bonaiuto & Arbib, 2010) subsumed the MNS while offering a functional role for the module in learning new sequences of action: instead of being driven by the observation of others' actions, the MNS in the ACQ model responded, not to what action was intended but to what it visually appeared to be. In this way, the mirror system was claimed to participate in learning novel actions or novel sequences of actions based on analysis of what one's actions appeared to be, which was shown to facilitate performance in acquiring new sequences of motor actions.
Socio-cognitive skill has been argued to be the prime driver of human neural and cognitive growth. Despite this central role these skills likely have played in human evolution-including in linguistic skill-few computational models have explicitly explored social behavior in primates or the neural mechanisms which coordinate social learning and behavior. Steels and colleagues have simulated multi-agent systems in language learning games, although with little emphasis on actual neural processing (Steels, 2003) . Oztop, Wolpert, and Kawato (2005) have built on the MNS models to examine neural mechanisms involved in intention decoding, although they did not offer an account of how these decoding processes affected downstream processing. Chersi, Ferrari, and Fogassi's (2011) model (See also Chersi, 2011) sought to explain the dataset from Fogassi et al. (2005) , whereby mirror neuron activities in inferior parietal lobule (IPL)-as distinct from F5-appear ''gated'' by task goals, as indicated in the experiment by the presence or absence of some stimuli. The model separates different pools of neurons within ''chains'' for each of the two possible conditions, and so upon observational conditions, the corresponding populations are residually activated-as in the data-specific to the indicated goal. Thus, the mirror neuron activities in IPL are ''sequence-specific.' ' Sauser and Billard's (2006) dual-route model of imitation-in humans-suggests mirror neuron-based mechanisms map others' performances onto one's own motor performance.
Our neurocomputational model, SCP1 (Gasser & Arbib, 2017) , was designed to explore possible mechanisms underlying the list learning capabilities of macaques revealed by use of the SCP (Terrace, 2005) . In this article, we extend SCP1 to yield a new model, SCP2, that can also explain observational learning effects in the observation condition compared to baseline rates, supporting a claim of ''cognitive imitation'' (Subiaul, Cantlon, Holloway, & Terrace, 2004) . In what follows, we summarize the key empirical data and summarize those properties of SCP1 needed to make clear the challenges in extending it to handle observational learning. We can then turn to details of SCP2 and the simulation results we obtained from it.
The SCP
Using the SCP, Terrace and colleagues probed monkeys' skill at list learning and the extent to which they (1) can learn the serial structure of individual lists, (2) can gradually become more competent at the task, (3) are sensitive to the serial structure of learned lists, and (4) are sensitive to observation of others' actions. (See Gasser and Arbib (2017) for details of data and modeling for (1)-(3); we treat (4) in detail below.) Items (photographs) intended to be learned as a list are presented simultaneously on a touch-screen monitor for the duration of a trial (Figure 1) , and a pre-specified order of selecting the items must be discovered through trial and error. The locations of the items on the touchscreen monitor are randomized across trials and thus do not contribute to learning the ordering, making the task quite difficult. (Thus, sequential order is not given by their location or order of presentation as in, for example, Barone and Joseph (1989) , the basis for the DAJ model of Dominey, Arbib, and Joseph (1995) .)
During training, the animal is incrementally shaped on the list, first mastering smaller sub-sequences of the list before more items are presented on the screen, until the full list is learned-giving implicit order information, at least at this stage of learning. Once performance criteria are met for the current iterationtypically, consecutive blocks of trials below a certain error rate, which may vary between experiments-items are appended to the end of the list, such that lists are incrementally presented-and learned-as follows:
List 1, Increment 1: A; List 1, Increment 2: A-B; List 1, Increment 3: A-B-C; List 1, Increment 4: A-B-C-D.
During each trial, then, the monkey sees the current set of items displayed on the screen. The configuration on the monitor does not change during the trial. Food delivery (reward) follows successful completion of the current full increment, but following selection of each correct item earlier in the sequence, the only feedback the animal receives is a briefly highlighted outline of the item selected. Repeat selections of an item are tolerated, but are not ''correct.'' Incorrect selections are immediately followed by a ''time-out'' (Swartz, Chen, & Terrace, 1991) during which an overhead light goes out. Either after successful completion of the complete list or after an error, the time-out is eventually followed by a new arrangement of the current set of items, and a new trial begins.
In this way, macaques were shown to successfully learn new lists over several blocks of 50 trials according to a criterion like ''got at least 75% of trials correct over two blocks of trials.'' Moreover, the data show that monkeys that have already learned a number of such incrementally shaped lists can learn full, 4-item-long lists in the absence of this form of incremental shaping (Swartz, Chen, & Terrace, 2000) . Other data suggest that naı¨ve monkeys can actually learn 3-item-long lists-''List X, Increment 3''-from the beginning without any prior incremental shaping (Terrace, Son, & Brannon, 2003) , but it has not been demonstrated, so far as we are aware, that naı¨ve animals can learn 4-item-long lists without at least some incremental shaping.
Having introduced the experimental paradigm within which the monkeys operated, we will now report the major behavioral findings on observational learning.
Observational learning effects
The protocol for the observation conditions is the same as in prior conditions, with the addition that two monkeys, in two neighboring chambers, are involved (Subiaul et al., 2004) . One monkey, having had prior experience on the tested list-that is, having reached criterion performance levels on the list (;75% accuracy)-is designated the ''teacher'' and will perform the list for one block of 50 consecutive trials (same 4-element list; random changes in disposition of the four items between trials). The other monkey, having had considerable prior experience with the task, but not with the current list, is designated the ''observer'': The observer can see through a window in its chamber to the teacher, the teacher's touch-screen monitor, and, importantly, to the slot where rewards are delivered. Thus, the observer can observe all the teacher's performance and feedback. The teacher performs each trial and is rewarded or punished as in the basic protocol. Following a block of 50 trials for the teacher, the observer's touch-screen monitor is activated and the observer is given an opportunity to master the list.
The results for two monkeys, Horatio and Oberon, are summarized in Figure 2 . Both monkeys were ''experts'' in the sense that each had over 5 years of intensive training (approximately 60 trials a day 5 days a week for most of the year), but, as discussed below, Oberon was more highly trained on SCP than Horatio. The measure used in Figure 2 was total trials until first correct performance, for each tested list. The authors argue this is the most sensitive measure, as learning and performance rates after the first correct trial would ''mix'' trial-and-error processes with social learning processes. Note, however, that ''implicit'' trial-anderror information still exists during performance of a list in this measure in that ''wrong'' selections are negatively reinforced and non-terminal correct selections may receive limited feedback-possibly implicitly reinforcing that selection. Indeed (although we do not consider this further), the brief highlighting of an item may become a source of positive reinforcement, although at a much lower level than the receipt of a reward after successful completion of the current list. The challenge for this article is to understand when and how reward and punishment are experienced during observation of a performance of a list.
In the social learning condition (observer observes teacher performing the same list), there was a significant increase in acquisition rate (i.e. lower number of ''responses until first correct trial'') compared to baseline rates, supporting a claim of ''cognitive imitation'' (Subiaul et al., 2004) . There was no significant facilitation effect, for either monkey, in the two control conditions: the computer feedback condition, where the tested list is performed by a computer in the neighboring chamber, selections being indicated by the brief highlight of each item but no monkey teacher is present, and the social facilitation condition whereby the teacher is present for the observer's block of trials, but the observer is given a different list than the teacher.
It should be noted, however, that there existed substantial variation between the two tested monkeys, in that the overall effects for each appeared driven by a greater sensitivity to only a subset of the actual items/ serial positions. That is, one monkey appeared exclusively facilitated by only selections 1 and 4-finegrained error rate analyses showed these positions were exclusively facilitated, while positions 2 and 3 showed no facilitation above baseline error-rates-and the other monkey was facilitated only by selections 2 and 3. Thus, each displayed an idiosyncratic pattern of facilitation, although importantly both were still significantly quicker to reach first correct trial than in the baseline condition. The idiosyncratic pattern was inexplicable by the authors (''At this stage of our research, we attach no importance to our subjects' idiosyncratic selection of the items while observing an expert execute the list.'')-and no eye-tracking to measure attention, for example, was employed. In their Supplementary Material, Subiaul et al. offer another perspective on the differences in the performance of these monkeys, stating that
One reason that might explain why Oberon and Horatio's performance differed on item-by-item accuracy might have to do with the fact that Oberon has significantly more experience than Horatio with the simultaneous chain task. This disparity in expertise might have resulted in differences in encoding efficiency during the social-learning condition.
Model design
We now extend the SCP1 model of how monkeys learn on their own to master SCP to show how they may acquire the same type of knowledge vicariously through observation of another monkey. Specifically, the SCP2 Figure 1 . The simultaneous chaining paradigm (SCP). Subjects must learn to press items on the screen in a pre-specified order. Each item can appear in nine possible positions on the screen, but these positions vary randomly across trials, thus removing sensorimotor associations that might facilitate learning. During training, any error immediately halts the trial, while successful selections are followed by a brief signal confirming that the selection has been registered. In the above, each column is a new trial for the same underlying sequence of patterns, with the first row showing the appearance of the touch-screen monitor on a specific trial, while the bottom row shows the proper sequence of motor responses the monkey must make. The lettering is included for the reader, not for the monkey. For the current model, we only consider lists up to four items long. Adapted from Terrace (2005) .
model extends the SCP1 model (Gasser & Arbib, 2017;  see Figure 3 ) by adding the mechanisms necessary to support observational learning: an action-recognition system and additional reward-processing machinery to respond to reward received by others (vicarious reinforcement). Most importantly, we implement the unidirectional flow of information needed for processing others' actions or the outcomes of others' action. Methodologically, this is a particular case of dyadic brain modeling (Arbib, Ganesh, & Gasser, 2014) , which models brains of both interacting animals in the attempt to assess the neural and cognitive systems involved in social learning, cognition, and interaction. In this study, performance of only one agent is affected by observation of the other.
We first review briefly the basic processing and learning mechanisms of the prior model, SCP1. But first a note of reassurance to the reader-the details of SCP1 are (almost) irrelevant to this article. The real contribution here is to use SCP to ground one answer to the following general and important question: Given a neural system that equips an agent to attempt to carry out some learning task based on its own interaction with the ''non-social'' world, what extra neural machinery is required to enable learning to be facilitated by (repeated) observation of successful completion of that task by another agent?
In our simulations, as in the original SCP experiments, learning of a list occurs in blocks of 50 trials. For each trial, the set of images on the screen is the same (1, 2, or 3 images during increment training; 4 images for the full list), but the position of those images on the 3 3 3 screen is varied randomly from trial to trial. Training on a given list continues until two successive blocks meet some criterion like 80% of the trials are performed correctly, that is, the images are touched in the specified order for the current list.
A summary of details of the SCP1 model
The key properties of SCP1 ( Figure 3 ) are that visual input is presented as a set of up to four items displayed on a 3 3 3 grid on a touch screen and that 1. Visual input yields a representation in visual working memory that pairs the neural code for recognition of a specific item with its position on the screen. 2. An intermediate network transforms this into a behavioral priority map, which replaces the item codes by priority values such that action selection circuitry (not shown here) will convert the display into a sequence of touches to locations on the screen in order of decreasing priority (until such time as the trial is completed with four successful touches or is aborted after an incorrect touch). 3. The dashed lines indicate adaptive weight matrices that become modified during learning to yield increasing skill in performing lists presented according to SCP. We briefly summarize the equations for SCP1, referring readers to the companion paper (Gasser & Arbib, 2017) for motivation, parameter values and the demonstration of how SCP1 supports interesting subtleties of the SCP dataset.
3.1.1. Visual processing. The input to the model is given by a 3 3 3 array. Dorsal and ventral pathways together build up a visual working memory, y v , that preserves the spatial distribution of the items but converts the retinal array for each item to an object recognition feature vector. This layer projects via modifiable weights W f to the temporal memory layer to establish a sequence of temporal context states that facilitate associations over time without chaining. In terms of SCP1, the contents of the visual working memory layer matter, not the way they are obtained.
3.1.2. Motor control: selecting the next response. The task of the SCP1 model is to learn how to transform the patterns in y v into the array of values (behavioral priorities) represented in the Behavioral Priority Map. Motor control must be able to take the array of values and direct a touch to the patterned squares in their order of priority. The particular mechanism that converts priority into action is of secondary importance to the key challenges for SCP1 and SCP2; details can be found in the Appendix ( Figure A1 ) of Gasser and Arbib (2017) .
3.1.3. Temporal memory layer. y v is fixed during the sequence of touches required to perform a trial. SCP1 must model how the monkey makes its next choice in the sequence and how it learns to master a sequence across multiple trials. We introduce a temporal memory system, y m (t), where t indexes time steps within a trial. At the beginning of a new trial, t is reset to 1, and . High-level model schematic for the SCP1 model (Gasser & Arbib, 2017) . Visual input in the form of a 3 3 3 array provides input to the model. Immediately, a dorsal and ventral path process the input, computing a binary representation of target locations that preserves spatial relations between items (dorsal) and visually discriminating the items based on their unique featurevector representation (ventral). Integrated visuo-spatial information is represented in a visual working memory layer. This layer informs downstream structures of the content and visuo-spatial features of the monitor. The temporal memory layer maintains the internal state of execution for the current list and projects, complementary to the value-based signal provided by the current motivational state, a temporal context signal that informs the behavioral priority map, which is composed of multiple layers not shown here. The major representations used in the model are visible, as are the learning pathways (dotted lines) that contribute to model performance. Learning itself is managed by an outcome-processing module that manages the feedback of the environment and interacts with relevant learning pathways (circled cross sections).
where S k is a process that maintains activity only in the k most active neurons (set equal to 1). As we shall see shortly, the crucial learning element here is W f . The success of SCP1 hinges on the ability of W f to ensure that the resultant state can learn biases that influence item selection. y m (t) then remains constant until a selection is made. If the selection is unsuccessful or if the whole list has been responded to correctly, the trial terminates. Otherwise, y m is updated after a successful selection according to
updating the layer via a fixed matrix W r that provides recurrent connectivity: each unit in the layer is connected with excitatory weights to all other units, with inhibitory self-connectivity. This ensures that any state y m (t) will be followed deterministically by a different state y m (t + 1). As explained by Gasser and Arbib (2017) , the design of the temporal working memory was inspired by the DAJ model (Dominey et al., 1995) , which was an example of reservoir computing (Lukosˇevicˇius & Jaeger, 2009 ) avant la lettre. Thus, the temporal working memory acts as a reservoir which provides a sequence of context states for the learning (described below) whereby the current screen display as encoded by y v is converted to the behavioral priority array p. The key difference is that DAJ employed a different sequence in the reservoir to learn each different sequence of actions, whereas SCP1 learns to generate a single list-specific reservoir sequence that can guide an appropriate action sequence for each disposition of images on the screen. W f establishes the initial state (1a) which is then updated each time a selection is made. However, the mapping from visual working memory content y v (t) to the temporal memory system y m (t) needs to be managed through learning. Following trial termination-either as a result of list completion or failure-learning processes strengthen or weaken associations between visual working memory content and the initial activation state of the temporal memory layer, changing only those weight values in W f , the weight matrix mapping visual features to the temporal memory layer for those nodes r and s that are active, that is, equal to ''1,'' in y v and y m , respectively. The change follows the formula
where a f is a learning rate constant and r p (t) is the value of the primary feedback, namely, 1 if rewarded (the sequence is completed successfully) and 20.1 if punished (i.e. the trial is discontinued due to an error). Over many trials, the model ''generalizes'' the task demands in part by establishing a consistent mapping to the temporal memory layer which facilitates list acquisition over time.
Thanks to equation (1a), the share W f can yield reservoir sequences specific to the current list. In both experiments and simulations, lists normally involve disjoint sets of images. This minimizes the disruption of adjustment of elements in W f relevant to one list when a new list is learned. In the exceptional case of a scrambled list, where familiar images are presented in a novel order, learning is retarded compared to the normal case.
3.1.4. Behavioral priority. As indicated earlier, the behavioral priority map is a network of 3 3 3 layers of neurons, topographically correlated with the monitor and the visual working memory layer. In order to drive appropriate decisions, the model must retrieve learned associations about each item: temporal context associations c(t) and reward-predictive or ''value-based'' associations v (t). The behavioral priority matrix p(t) combines these via
where s b (t) is Gaussian noise injected to provide variability that assists learning.
Temporal context associations: Just as we specified learning for a matrix W f for the connections from the visual working memory to the temporal memory system, so we now specify learning for a matrix W c for connections from temporal memory state y m (t) to the behavioral priority map. Associations must be established between the evolving temporal context states and the visible items, and these associations must bias selections independent of value-based biases. The temporal context signal c(t) is given by
where y m (t) is the temporal memory state at time t and W c is the modifiable weight matrix which encodes the temporal context associations. The modifiable weight matrix is adapted according to associative learning
where a c is the context learning rate and r e (t) is the effective reinforcement (not the primary reinforcement), which is equal to 1 unless the selection is incorrect, in which case it is equal to -1 (i.e. state + item associations are positively reinforced unless followed directly by negative feedback). Weights are re-normalized by decreasing all the weights of non-selections by a factor of DW c . The learning is ''competitive'' in that learning of one state + item association, per selection, comes at the expense of the associations between the current temporal context state and all other items.
Value-based associations: Temporal-difference reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998) allows v (t) to estimate value associations for each visible item. This influences decision-making in a manner complementary to learned temporal context signals (see Gasser and Arbib (2017) for details).
What SCP2 adds to the SCP1 Model
We now turn to the extended model (SCP2; Figure 4 ) for simulations of the observational learning condition. Note that SCP1 suffices to model the teacher since it does not observe the observer. This is in contrast to a fully dyadic model (as in Arbib et al., 2014) in which each member of the dyad learns from interaction with the other. Following each selection by the teacher, the actionrecognition system of the observer processes the selection and activates its own representation for that item. In parallel to this, SCP2 must maintain its own evolving representation of the temporal context so that the con-text+item associations can be made. That is, the observer model must not only recognize each selection made by the teacher but also update its temporal context state vicariously. Crucially, the observer model must process the outcome of the trial to determine whether the teacher's selections were successful (rewarded) or not (time-out), in order to appropriately upgrade (reward) or downgrade (time-out) the relevant context+item association.
Attention to such details of the other's behavior is not shared by all animals, and so we are here positing that the macaque has specific circuitry that other animals may not possess.
Action recognition.
Successful recognition of each selection by the teacher must be made by the observing model. This has two components. The first, subsumed in the way the model is structured, is that the animal will observe both the input pattern that the teacher is working on and the selection made by the teacher. Clearly, an animal naı¨ve to SCP may find no reason to attend to either of these, perhaps only registering that the other animal seems to get a reward while ''messing . Dyadic brain modeling for observational learning. The monitor serves as the visual input to both teacher and observer, resulting in a representation in visual working memory. (Right) We show the SCP1 model for the teacher, who has already learned a 4-item list. On each trial, the teacher makes a sequence of selections based on the visual input and learned associations. (Left) We show the SCP2 model for the observer. This extends the SCP1 model (although we omit the priority map from this diagram) by adding a mirror neuron module to recognize the action taken by the teacher. Implicit in the diagram is the transformation from the observed reward or punishment of the teacher to a vicarious reward or punishment signal for the observer: where ''reward processing'' in SCP1 processes only the actual reinforcement; in SCP2, it must contain both this basic pathway and also the additional pathway for processing reward received by others. The mirror neuron action-recognition module processes the teacher's current action (specifically, a touch to the visual pattern selected), computes the appropriate internal representation for that selection (note that each model represents features and states differently), and outputs the representation to the learning module. (In addition, the action-recognition module manages updating of the temporal memory layer for the observer.) The resulting representation, the current temporal memory state, and any rewarded outcomes (positive or negative) are translated to eventually enact synaptic weight changes.
around'' with the screen. Second, SCP2 must add to SCP1's processing of the visual state of the touch screen, the new capability for action recognition. As noted earlier, there are several neurocomputational models of the ability of mirror neurons to participate in the processing and recognition of others' actions. In SCP2, however, we do not explicitly model at the neurocomputational level but simply provide a black box to process the reaching actions of the teacher to deliver a representation of that particular selection to the observer.
3.2.2. Updating temporal working memory. We have seen that temporal working memory acts as a reservoir in SCP1. At each new trial, equation (1a) employs matrix W f to initiate a new context state in the reservoir dependent on what is on the touch screen, while equation (1b) employs matrix W r to update the context state after each successful selection during a trial. W r is fixed, whereas W f is updated for those nodes r and s that are active, that is, equal to ''1,'' in y v and y m , respectively, according (as in SCP1) to
where a f is a learning rate constant and r p (t) is the value of the primary feedback, namely, 1 if rewarded (the sequence is completed successfully) and 20.1 if punished (i.e. the trial is discontinued due to an error). The only difference in SCP2 is that while (a) this holds when the simulated monkey is in ''active mode,'' that is, it is itself interacting with the touch screen, (b) in ''observer mode,'' r p (t) is based on the observed feedback for the teacher's actions. Note that this does not involve a representation of the action chosen by the teacher, only observation of the feedback received by the teacher.
In essence, then, updating W f in observer mode requires a ''mirror system'' for recognizing the reward (''feeling the pain, or pleasure'') of the other. Where ''reward processing'' in SCP1 processes only the actual reinforcement, in SCP2 it must contain both this basic pathway and the additional pathway for processing reward received by others.
Behavioral priority.
In SCP1, the signal that determines item selection is the behavioral priority signal, which itself is composed of a value-based component and a context-based component (equations (3)-(5) above).
These equations continue to hold in SCP2 when the simulated monkey is in active mode. In observational mode, r e (t) is again the reward experienced by the teacher as routed through the SCP2 reward-processing module. Figure 2 , summarizing observational learning effects from the SCP as observed by (Subiaul et al., 2004) . There were three cases: (a) the social learning condition where the observer sees the teacher performing on the list he will then be asked to learn; (b) the computer feedback condition, in which no ''teacher'' monkey was present, and instead the computer ''selection'' of an item was shown by briefly highlighted borders around the item; and (c) the social facilitation condition where the observer sees the teacher perform a different list from the one he will then be asked to learn.
Computers are not monkeys. Let us now return to
In describing SCP2, we posited recognition of the reward received by the teacher monkey as providing a ''vicarious reward'' signal for the operation of the updating rules (2) and (5). However, there is no reason to expect the flashing lights of the computer feedback condition to be experienced by the observer as vicarious reward, and so both r p (t) and r e (t) are set to 0 in this condition. Here, it may be relevant to recall how children perform with (though perhaps slowly) ''ghost controls,'' that is, where they observe events occurring without an apparent agent, as if executed by a ''ghost'' or unobserved causal forces. Here, children perform worse in a ghost condition than in a live condition, but still learn above chance levels (Hopper, 2010; Subiaul, Vonk, & Rutherford, 2011) . However, Subiaul et al. (2004) had no way to evaluate how much attention ''student'' monkeys were paying to the computer in the chamber next to them. It is possible that if the computer feedback had been more salient (i.e. more dynamic or contingent on the monkey looking in its direction), student monkeys might have learned in this ghost condition.
Methods and simulation results
To test whether our model could learn from observation, we carried out 10 simulations according to the following protocol:
1. We trained two copies of the SCP1 model-''teacher'' and ''observer''-(for each copy following the procedure reported in Gasser & Arbib, 2017) : For four lists in turn, the model was trained on blocks of 50 trials until criterion was reached with high accuracy on two successive blocks. 2. A novel 4-element list was constructed and the ''teacher'' model was trained on that list. In the experiment and the simulation, the observer does not ''see'' the actor learning. 3. The observer sees 20 trials of skilled task execution (there were 50 such trials in the experiments). Almost all observed trials are correct. During this period, the observer is in ''SCP2'' mode: W f and W c are updated according to SCP2.
4. Following observation of the block of 20 trials executed by the teacher, the observer model was then tasked with performing this new list (here it is operating according the base model, SCP1, with feedback on its own performance, rather than observation of the teacher's performance). We measured both the time to first correct trial and overall performance levels.
Results
For the measure of ''time to first correct trial,'' the observer model, on average, achieved a correct trial in approximately 3.9 trials (see List 6 in Figure 5 ), statistically (p \ .01) a more rapid acquisition as compared to the baseline rate of 21.3 total trials to first correct trial (Lists 1-4 in Figure 5 ). By other measures as well, it is clear that the observation condition can lead to facilitation: blocks until criterion and percent correct after 50 or 100 trials. Finally, we tested whether the task experience each animal had prior to the testing of the effects of observation influenced the behavioral results. To do so, we trained a single model to criterion levels (the teacher), but for the observer model, we provided no trainingso that it was not only ''list-naı¨ve'' but ''task-naı¨ve'' as well. We then followed the above procedure and tested for possible facilitation. The observer model in this condition was unable to ever acquire the list, showing no facilitation from observation (see Figure 5, List 7) . This is because (Gasser & Arbib, 2017) the temporal memory layer-the layer of neurons managing the internal temporal signals, that is, the evolving state of execution-is at first randomly activated by the varied visuo-spatial inputs it receives, and only over substantial learning does this layer stabilize to facilitate both the establishment of associative biases and then later the retrieval of these biases. Since the naı¨ve model has not generalized across this varied input-space, any associations it establishes on a particular trial are unlikely to be retrievable in future.
As we have seen, the model suggests that some neural circuit must integrate observation of another's action with information on the value feedback of the action as well as with subtle contextual information. Let us consider this further. Given the assumption that Figure 5 . Model behavioral results. Performance measures across list types are shown. For all lists and for all performance measures, performance of only the length 4 increment is shown. Lists 1-4 are the incrementally shaped lists learned prior to observation of the teacher. List 5 is a simultaneous list, that is, a 4-element list to be learned by SCP1 without incremental shaping. List 6 is a list to be learned after observation of correct performance on the list by a teacher. The figure shows that SCP1 performance on the incremental lists (Lists 1-4) and the simultaneous lists (List 5) are more difficult to master than the observation condition (List 6), which shows facilitation following a teacher's performance. However, there is no facilitation effect when the observation condition is not preceded by training (i.e. Step 1 of the protocol is omitted), and the observer is instead task-naïve (List 7). In this condition, the model is unable to master any 4-item-long list. (Note that for the figures on the left, List 7 is neglected so as not to skew the figure's scaling.)
there is no vicarious reward when observing a ''computer'' and given that Lists 1-4 show little consistent variation in list mastery from one list to the next, it is trivial that the model shows no significant facilitation effect during the computer feedback condition and the social facilitation condition, in accord with the experimental data of Figure 2 . However, it must be stressed that our results for the crucial social learning condition are qualitative, not quantitative. In our model, observational learning yielded an average reduction from 21 to 3.9 for the number of trials to first correct trial, whereas the numbers for Horatio and Oberon (Figure 2(a) ) were 19.5 ! 11.8 and 15.9 ! 9.7, respectively. This leads to two comments. (a) Strangely, as noted earlier, one monkey was only facilitated on learning the first and third elements of the observed list, while the other was only facilitated on the second and fourth. Far more empirical data would be required to assess the range of individual differences that would have to be factored into the model. (b) The dramatic reduction in the model from 21 to 3.9 is simply accounted for: We set the vicarious reward for observer mode in SCP2 to equal the actual values for the active mode. Thus, the updates to W f and W c on return to active mode were essentially a continuation of those made during observation mode-but with the proviso that earlier feedback was based on the teacher's actions rather than those that would have been made were the observer acting on the basis of its own W f and W c . Given a larger dataset, one could introduce a scaling factor (vicarious reward is less than actual reward) and an attentional probability (a monkey focused on getting an actual reward would be less distracted than the observer). In either case, though, the data on Horatio and Oberon suggest that something more varied than such scaling would be required to account for individual differences.
Discussion
Our SCP2 model incorporates action-recognition and reward-processing elements in order to reproduce the pattern of results from (Subiaul et al., 2004) showing sensitivity to observational conditions. We have emphasized the importance to the observer of recognizing not only the action of the teacher but also the reward being experienced by the teacher. A variety of results, but not enough of them, point the way to further investigation of the mechanisms that underlie these capabilities. ''Ingestive-type'' mirror neurons in monkey F5 (Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi, 2003) exhibit mirror properties to mouth movements, including sucking juice from a canulla. This suggests that mirror systems may participate in recognizing outcome feedback as well as appropriate motor acts. Furthermore, ''social gaze'' mirror neurons have been described in lateral intraparietal sulcus, LIP (Shepherd, Klein, Deaner, & Platt, 2009 ), suggesting links between objects of attention can be made in posterior parietal cortex as a (partial) basis for social interaction. Moreover, F5 mirror neurons have been found sensitive to the reward potential of observed actions (Caggiano et al., 2012) .
In many mirror neuron studies, animals were ''passively'' observing, and thus the recordings were unable to say anything about how the information was used. In a departure from these non-interactive designs, Yoshida, Saito, Iriki, and Isoda (2011) revealed ''otherresponsive'' neurons in medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), apparently important for managing turn-taking during the task, as well as neurons encoding the errors of others (Yoshida, Saito, Iriki, & Isoda, 2012) . Other (medial) frontal structures have been implicated in the monitoring of others' behavior, with anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) neurons observed to be sensitive to the rewards accrued by others (Chang, Garie´py, & Platt, 2013) . Orbito-frontal (Azzi, Sirigu, & Duhamel, 2012) , prefrontal (Fujii, Hihara, Nagasaka, & Iriki, 2008) , and striatal (Santos, Nagasaka, Fujii, & Nakahara, 2011) populations have also been found modulated by social context. In all these experiments, we see that much more is involved in observing and/or interacting with others than just encode an observed action.
Thus, there are many open questions regarding the role of mirror neurons in action observation, action understanding, and/or social learning. We suggest that computational models may prove useful in exploring these open questions:
1. Few studies have explored what downstream target mirror neurons project to-that is, in what ways the observed responses, either experimentally (as in or in model simulations (as in Bonaiuto et al., 2007) , influence the observer's future behavior. Elsewhere, in modeling gesture acquisition in chimpanzees, we have suggested one possible answer, that actionrecognition systems may modulate one's goal state to adapt one's behavior as a function of what one observes or recognizes from another (Arbib et al., 2014) . 2. Few models offer insight into (possible) comparative differences in primates, which should be important considering the apparent differences observed behaviorally (Dean et al., 2012; Horner & Whiten, 2005) . For example, Lopes, Melo, Kenward, and Santos-Victor (2009) show how imitative versus emulative learning-reproducing the means over the ends, or vice versa-could be controlled by a parameter, which weighs ''means'' and ''ends'' information on a spectrum so that more or less imitative behavior can be achieved. But such a model is descriptive rather than being able to address differences in neural circuitry, such as Hecht et al.'s (2013) data on differences in macaques, chimpanzees, and humans as revealed by diffusion tensor imaging. Claims of imitative behavior in the wild in apes, for example, suggest a role for long-term trial-and-error learning, with social learning seen as ''parsing'' the behavior of an adult and guiding one's own attempts at reproducing the sequence of demonstrated behaviors, but with learning occurring incrementally in time to both structure the performance and learn new motor skills (Byrne, 2003) . 3. Learners need to pay attention to the effects of others' performances, lest they imitate obviously harmful behaviors. Thus, social learning involves more than just ''transcribing'' others' actions into one's own motor repertoire, but processing relevant context and the feedback and/or reward implications of the actions (i.e. perhaps that what was observed was ''bad''). Horner and Whiten (2005) have shown that children may imitate an action in a sequence even if it is clearly irrelevant to reaching the current goal, whereas a chimpanzee may recognize such an action as maladaptive (in terms of costing time and extra effort) and omit it. While such ''over-imitation'' might seem like a bad strategy for humans, we (Arbib, 2011) suggested that it makes possible the acquisition of new skills even though the relevance of certain actions may be inscrutable during early stages of learning, thus opening the way to a complexity of culture inaccessible to nonhuman primates.
However, we see two important points to make here: (a) the relevance of considering task knowledge, and (b) the importance of being in the right state. As our simulations showed, task-naıve monkeys showed no improved learning during observation blocks; only list-naıve monkeys did. This is not because learning centers were not engaged during these blocks for the task-naı¨ve observer (in fact, granting this may even be a generous assumption); instead, what was ''learned'' was random and not consistent across trials, as the temporal context memory would begin in random states for each new trial. In the case of the list-naı¨ve observer, however, the model was previously able to train the mapping from visual features (even those features that are novel) to the temporal context memory and to facilitate subsequent performance. In this way, the monkeys are more likely learning through facilitation-not at the level of specific items in specific lists but rather through more general expertise-dependent changes in the underlying network. (In fact, in Subiaul et al., the tested monkeys had been trained on upward of 40 novel lists prior to the observational conditions.)
The second point concerns the importance of being properly motivated to attend to the actor monkey. Subiaul et al. in fact sought to test against facilitation, by testing two additional manipulations: (a) a social component without demonstration, and (b) a demonstration without a social component. These additional manipulations-tested in Subiaul et al. and simulated here-show that social learning is more complicated than being capable of processing particular information. The animal must be in the appropriate ''state''motivationally and cognitively-and must be able to glean the value-outcome of observed actions. Few direct studies have investigated this, although the available data seem to converge on this assessment as well. Azzi et al. (2012) showed OFC neurons that differentially responded to reward allocations exclusively to oneself and when shared with a ''partner'' monkey, apparently encoding the motivational salience as a function of social context. Interestingly, there have also been tests in macaques assessing how lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) responses engaged during social interaction conditions vary when interacting with a conspecific, or a computer, during competitive video games (Hosokawa & Watanabe, 2012) , showing modulation correlated with either partner. The modulations also correlate with behavioral patterns, with the monkeys apparently more engaged and motivated when competing against a conspecific. Other ''interactive'' task designs have elucidated response profiles of neurons in other regions, including striatal neurons signaling the value of social information (Klein & Platt, 2013) and medial PFC neurons processing others' actions (Yoshida et al., 2011) and errors (Yoshida et al., 2012) .
While we have emphasized cases above where single neuron data are available (i.e. in monkey studies), there is much to be learned from studies with other primates-whether human or otherwise-to constrain both basic models of learning (such as SCP1) and the search for a general understanding of what further mechanisms can make observational learning possible, as in the extension of SCP1 to SCP2 which, we have seen, involves ''wrapping'' the basic model in a ''wrapper'' which provides not only action recognition but vicarious ward in observing the other.
Work with preschool age children using the SCP (Subiaul, Anderson, Brandt, & Elkins, 2012; Subiaul, Patterson, & Barr, 2016; Subiaul, Patterson, Schilder, Renner, & Barr, 2015) shows that children who do not receive prior training perform poorly on the imitation condition relative to children who have received such training. However, non-trained children imitate at rates greater than chance on the first trial (a measure that completely exclude any trial and error or operant learning). Nonetheless, this may be because the task does not have the complete novelty relative to other tasks in which the child has engaged that SCP has for the naı¨ve monkey. What might be useful about using preschool age children to understand the underlying cognitive components of this may rest on a fuller exploration of prior experience and the general possibility of transfer learning. Observing how children go from being poor to being exceptional imitators may help us figure out what cognitive processes are necessary for success in this task and then, perhaps, work backward to figure out whether the skills that facilitate imitation in children are present in nonhuman animals. Here, we should stress that different primate species may achieve very different levels of competence (Renner, 2015; Renner, Abramo, Karen Hambright, & Phillips, 2017; Renner, Price, & Subiaul, 2016; Subiaul, Renner, & Krajkowski, 2016) so that an extended exercise here in computational comparative primatology might allow us to more insightfully characterize the species-specific wrappings of learning systems for certain tasks that may (or may not) support observational learning for those tasks.
